Angola

Angola is the textbook case of an oil-dependent African economy attempting a managed pivot. Sub-Saharan Africa's third-largest oil producer, it generated roughly $142bn in nominal GDP in 2025, yet oil still accounts for ~60% of government revenue and ~95% of exports. Crude output fell below 1 million bpd for the first time in the post-OPEC era in July 2025; Angola left OPEC in early 2024, gaining freedom to pump but not reversing the 8–12% annual decline in its ageing deepwater fields.

The distinctive asset is the Lobito Corridor — a US- and EU-backed rail artery linking the copper-cobalt Copperbelt of the DRC and Zambia to the Atlantic at the Port of Lobito, and the flagship of Western infrastructure competition with China in Africa. Angola reinforced its positioning by chairing the African Union in 2025, prioritising transport connectivity and intra-African trade, alongside a fast-growing diamond sector and the PROPRIV privatisation programme.

The investment thesis is therefore not the oil; it is what the Lourenço government builds with — and around — declining hydrocarbon rents. The risks are concrete: growth slowed to ~3.1% in 2025, real per-capita income remains well below its 2014 level, inequality is among the world's highest, and the kwanza and debt service remain hostage to oil prices despite debt easing to ~55% of GDP. A credible diversification story with a genuine geopolitical tailwind — but the clock on oil revenue is the binding constraint.